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Abstract
We propose a framework for understanding recurrent historical episodes of vigorous
economic expansion accompanied by extreme asset valuations, as exhibited by the U.S.
in the 1990s. We interpret this phenomenon as a high-valuation equilibrium with a
low effective cost of capital based on optimism about the future availability of funds
for investment. The key to the sustainability of such an equilibrium is feedback from
increased growth to an increase in the supply of effective funding. We show that such
feedback arises naturally when an expansion comes with technological progress in the
capital producing sector, when fiscal rules generate sustained fiscal surpluses, when
the rest of the world has lower expansion potential, and when financial constraints are
relaxed by the expansion itself. Arguably, these ingredients were all simultaneously
present in the U.S. during the 1990s. We also show that such expansions can be welfare
improving but they can crash. The latter is more likely if bubbles develop along the
expansionary path. These (rational) bubbles can emerge even when the interest rate
exceeds the rate of growth of the economy.
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1 Introduction
Economic history has witnessed many stark "speculative growth" episodes of extreme stock
market valuations accompanied by brisk economic growth. The most notable recent expe-
rience was that of the United States in the 1990s. Figure la illustrates the sharp rise in
the NASDAQ in the 1990s, followed by the collapse of 2000-2001. The extremes reached
by valuations shown in figure lb, and their collapse in the absence of obvious changes in
fundamentals, are suggestive of widespread speculation. Figures Ic and Id illustrate the
growth and investment boom-and-bust that accompanied the market's gyrations^.
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Figure 1: Speculative Growth in the US.
The nature and policy dilemmas of speculative expansions have attracted much attention
(e.g., International Monetary Fund 2000, Shiller 2000, Cecchetti et al. 2000), but our formal
understanding of the macroeconomic mechanisms that underlie the relation between stock
market speculation and real economic activity remains quite limited. It is always possible
to attribute such episodes to irrational exuberance, and indeed it is highly likely that some
'Note: Panel b: the numerator is the real (inflation-adjusted) Datastream Total Market Index; denom-
inator is moving average over preceding ten years of real earnings corresponding to the index. Sources:
Panel a: Nasdaq Composite Index from The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc, SP 500 from Datastream. Panel
b: Datastream Total Market Index for US. Panel c: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Panel d: BEA.
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Figure 2: Long Real and Nominal Rates.
of that is invariably present. But what are the environments that facilitate these bouts of
irrationality or, put differently, that facilitate the confusion of intelligent economic agents
by having a rational path that is not too distant from observation?
In this paper we take an extreme approach to answering the previous question and look
for rational expectations equilibria that can mimic speculative growth episodes. We take a
hint from the recent U.S. episode to formulate owe theory. We start from the observation
that long run interest rates, and in particular the cost of capital faced by growing companies,
declined throughout the 1990s. The dotted line in figure 2 illustrates the path of the 10-
year US Treasury-bond rate, to which we subtract the University of Michigan Inflation
Expectations Index to obtain the corresponding real rate (solid line). The latter 's decline
during the 1990s is apparent: the difference between the average real rates for the 1980s
and 1990s (dashed lines) is about 200 basis points.
Such a decline can account for a significant share of the observed rise in asset prices: The
decline in the real rates implicit in US Treasury bonds alone can explain over 50 percent of
the rise in broad market's valuations during the second half of the 1990s, and if one is to
consider the further decline in risk premia due to increased participation in stock markets
(admittedly a somewhat circular argument), then that share rises to 80 percent or more.^^
Once such rise has taken place, the investment and output growth boom that followed can
•^See, e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) for a model and evidence on the relation between participation and
the equity premium.
^A fact that was not missed by economic commentators, and indeed was extrapolated to extreme limits
by a sequel of bestsellers starting with "Dow 36,000: The new strategy for profiting from the coming rise in
the stock market," by Glassman and Hassett (1999).

be rationalized along standard q — theory arguments.
However, the key general equilibrium question in the above story is: How are expecta-
tions of a low long-term cost of capital consistent with the high demand for savings needed
to fund a high-investment equilibrium? Limited to rational explanations, this necessarily
means that along the expansionary path agents expect an increase in the availability of
funding to more than offset the demand for such funding. The source of this shift could
be exogenous or endogenous. In our model and account of the U.S. episode we include
both but highlight the latter since the crash of 2000-2001 cannot be matched by a com-
mensurate exogenous shock. Thus the central ingredient of ovir model is a growth-funding
feedback by which the future supply of effective funding increases as a result of the condi-
tions created by a speculative expansion, and ends up lowering the cost of capital (the word
effective is added to encompass the important decline in the price of new capital relative to
consumption goods during the 1990s).
We show that speculative growth episodes can be welfare improving but they are also
susceptible to crashes. The latter are more likely if bubbles develop along the expansionary
path.
Of independent interest is the fact that in our environment rational bubbles exhibit
more realistic features than in the standard setup. In the latter, bubbles can only appear in
a "dynamically inefficient" economy, that is one whose structure is conducive to the over-
accumulation of capital. Their emergence is welfare improving as they help to absorb saving
away from investment and to alleviate the over-accumulation problem. However, the notion
that bubbles and investment move in opposite directions is contrary to the patterns depicted
in figmre 1. Moreover, empirical testing of "dynamic inefficiency" has been negative. Abel
et al. (1989) tested an implication of dynamic inefficiency, whether the aggregate market for
assets acts as a long-term "cash sink" for investors, but found no evidence of it in OECD
economies. Finally, the idea that bubbles are inherently good runs counter much of the
perception of policymakers and practitioners.
In contrast, since in our model a speculative growth episode anticipates increased fund-
ing, bubbles may emerge even when the current interest exceeds the rate of growth of the
economy and the corporate sector generates a surplus. And while it is still the case that
the emergence of a bubble crowds out resources for investment, the speculative growth dy-
namics guarantees that investment still booms along the path. By the same token, if the
speculative growth path crashes then no longer the conditions exist for a rational bubble to
survive (for the same reason that a bubble cannot exist in the dynamically efficient region

of the standard model) and it must crash as well. Finally, a bubble that emerges early on
in a speculative path is costly because it crowds out potentially welfare improving capital
accumulation and because it overexposes the economy to a crash.
We show that a growth-funding feedback arises naturally when an expansion comes with
technological progress, especially, in the capital producing sector; when fiscal rules generate
sustained fiscal surpluses; when the rest of the world has lower expansion potential; and
when financial constraints are relaxed by the expansion itself. Arguably, these ingredients
were all simultaneously present in the U.S. during the 1990s.
How does technological progress, especially in the capital producing sector, generate
feedback from growth to funding? On one end, technological progress raises future in-
comes and with it saving available for investment. On the other, relatively fast techno-
logical progress in capital producing sectors reduces the saving needed to finance a higher
steady-state capital-output ratio. In this context, a fundamental expansion in productivity
and stock market speculation are not necessarily competing explanations of an specula-
tive growth episode, as most observers had it during the 1990s. A technological revolution
might form an integral part — both as cause and consequence — of a speculative growth
equilibrium.
What about fiscal policy? We note that a significant share of increased available funding
in the U.S. speculative expansion of the 1990s was attributable to public sector's saving. To
the extent that pro-cyclical government revenues increase public saving, they reinforce the
feedback from growth to saving. In the short run, fiscal surpluses can arise as a consequence
of the boom and can facilitate the initial rise in investment. More importantly, fiscal
surpluses can play a central role in making the speculative equilibrium feasible by providing
the funding necessary to sustain high investment in the long run. This consideration has
a particularly stark implication for fiscal policy during a speculative growth episode. The
possibility of using the fiscal sinpluses that result from such expansions to cut taxes and raise
spending could be illusory, as these surpluses might be necessary to sustain the speculative
growth equilibrium that generated them.
A similar role is played by external saving, the other significant source of increase in
aggregate saving during the 1990s. In the short run, capital flows alleviate the pressure
on short run interest rates brought about by the investment boom. In the long run, if the
potential productivity in the high investment equilibrium is higher at home than abroad,
then the speculative growth path itself yields a reallocation of global investment toward
domestic assets. Moreover, the speculative growth path itself may be made feasible by a

decline in opportunities abroad.
Finally, if the expansion relaxes financial constraints faced by productive entrepreneurs,
then aggregate saving is reallocated toward them. The expansion of the 1990s clearly
achieved this goal by facilitating the reallocation of capital toward the mostly small and
emerging companies of the new economy sectors. Some of these companies were undoubtedly
bubbles and crowded out capital from good firms, but many others were the pillars of the
information technology revolution that was so central to the episode.
The speculative growth episodes to which our theory relates are a recurrent phenomenon.
Earlier episodes of vigorous economic expansion under speculative asset valuations have
been documented by economic historians. In the case of the U.S., this phenomenon also
can be observed in the expansions of the turn of the 20th centiury, the 1920s, and the 1960s
(see, e.g., Shiller 2000). Equally important, our theory can be brought to bear on sustained
low cost-of-capital equilibria, such as the prolonged expansions exhibited in a number of
East Asian economies in the post-war period. In fact, the key feedback from growth to
funding in these economies has been documented. Examining the aggregate relationship
between income growth and saving in a cross-country panel of 64 countries over the period
1958-1987, Caroll and Weil (1994) find that growth Granger causes saving with a positive
sign, but that saving does not Granger cause growth. The pattern of an acceleration in
growth followed by strong increases in saving rates is particularly clear in the high-growth,
high-saving East Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Gavin
et al. (1997) elaborate on this evidence and show that the estimated impact of growth on
saving is not only statistically significant but also very large in economic terms.
In its economic theme, this paper is part of a long tradition of studies of speculative
growth episodes (e.g., Kindleberger 1989). In terms of the recent U.S. experience, this
literature is divided between those who see a case of speculative behavior (e.g., Shiller
2000), and those who, based on the significant acceleration in underlying U.S. productivity
growth, conclude that the expansion was driven by a technological revolution that affected
real fundamentals (e.g.. Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2000).
Prom this perspective, oiu: contribution is to provide a unified perspective under which these
two views need not be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, an expansion of technological
opportunities and stock market speculation may come hand on hand.
This perspective finds support in the evidence of Beaudry and Portier (2003), who device
a novel semi-structural VAR procedure to conclude that the US business cycle is largely
driven by a shock that does not affect productivity in the short run but that is strongly

related to future productivity growth. They argue that such shock could well represent a
coordination device. Similarly, Christiano and Fisher (2003) conclude that the explanatory
power ofRBC style models is greatly enhanced by the introduction of procyclicaJ investment
shocks. In our model, the comovements emphasized by Christiano and Fisher arise from a
single shock, and the latter may be mostly of the coordination sort hinted by Beaudry and
Portier's findings.
On the methodological side, our paper belongs to the literature on multiple equilibria.
This literature is too extensive to review here (see, e.g., Benhabib and Farmer (1999)), but
it is interesting to point out some of the similarities and differences with Krugman (1991),
who develops a trade model with external economies and adjustment costs. In that model,
if adjustment costs are too small, then multiple equilibria arise and expectations dominate.
On the other hand, when adjustment costs are large enough, the multiple equilibria region
disappears and only history matters. In contrast, in our model multiple equilibria arise only
for intermediate adjustment costs. As in Krugman, we need adjustment costs to be small in
order to be able to afford a transition to a high capital equilibrium. Unlike Krugman's, we
also need adjustment costs to be large enough to generate sufficient capital gains to justify
the investment boom along the transition.
We also relate on the methodological and substantive side to the literature on bubbles in
general equilibrium. The seminal work by Tirole (1985) set up the foundation for the analy-
sis of bubbles in general equilibrium, but when embedded in the basic unique-equilibrimn
OLG model it generates implications that are at odds with speculative growth episodes.
In particular, it implies that investment and bubbles experience negative comovement and
that the latter only can arise in a dynamically inefficient economy. Neither of these elements
is observed dmring these episodes. Partly for this reason, a large literature has developed to
modify the basic structure. For example, several papers have demonstrated that, in the pres-
ence of externalities that create a wedge between private and social returns on investment,
bubbles can arise even if the bubbleless economy is dynamically efficient (e.g., Saint-Paul,
1992; Grossman and Yanagawa, 1993; King and Ferguson, 1993). Ventura (2003) takes this
logic a step further and shows that with segmented financial markets bubbles may emerge
when only the marginal savers face interest rates below the rate of growth of the economy.
Olivier (2000) addresses the negative-comovement problem and shows how bubbles on firm
creation can lead to more rather than less investment. Aside from the difference in the spe-
cific mechanism we emphasize, in our model conventional rational bubbles exhibit positive
comovement with investment and arise even when all investors and savers face high (and
private) interest rates.
6

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a prototypical
model of speculative growth. Our analysis is based on the Diamond (1965) overlapping-
generations model, to which we add adjustment costs and a special assumption about the
saving function. Adjustment costs allow us to characterize stock market booms and their key
role in facilitating the transition from low- to high-investment equilibria. Our special saving
function generically captiures the growth-funding feedback that is central to the existence of
a high-valuation equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the possibility of bubbles and the fragility
they introduce to a speculative growth episode. Section 4 presents specific mechanisms that
may have facilitated an speculative growth episode in the US during the 1990s. Namely,
fiscal surpluses, capital flows, and technological progress in the equipment sector. Section
5 shows how financial constraints a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also have the potential
to generate the type of growth-funding mechanisms that we emphasize. Section 6 discusses
welfare issues, and Section 7 concludes. Several appendices follow.
2 Speculative Growth
In this section we present a prototypical model of speculative growth. Our analysis is based
on a linearized version of the Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations model. We capture
the growth-funding feedback mechanism through a generic funding function that relaxes
Diamond's stability condition.^ Our focus in this paper is not so much on what is behind
the violation of the stability condition (although we do provide specific mechanisms later
on) , as is on the other features of the economy that make such modelling change a potentially
important source of speculative growth episodes. In Section 4 we discuss specific features
that may have played a role in the US episode during the 1990s. In this section, on the
other hand, we focus on building the basic structure of the economy. One key ingredient in
this structure is the presence of the "right" amount of adjustment costs to capital. With too
much adjustment costs, transitions are too costly and equilibrium becomes unique. With
too little adjustment costs, there are neither stock market booms nor multiple equilibria,
which are central features of the speculative growth episodes we wish to model.
2.1 The Growth-funding feedback
Consider a standard Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations structure with no population
growth and a unit mass of young and old agents who coexist at any date t. Each generation
^See Diamond (1965), page 1134.

is born with a unit of labor, L = 1, to be used when young, for which it receives a total
wage Wt determined in a competitive, full-employment labor market. The economy's single
constunption good is used as a numeraire.
Consumption goods are produced with capital, Kt, and labor, Lt- The production
function at any time t is determined by the level of technology. At, which grows at an
exogenous rate 7:
Ai+i = (l + 7)At.
Production is given by a constant returns technology, F{Kt,AtL). Letting kt = Kt/AtLt
denote capital per effective worker, we write the marginal product of capital as:
Mkt), n < 0.
The labor market is competitive, and the wage wt = Wt/AtL per unit of effective labor can
be written as:
Wt = w{kt) w' > 0. (1)
Lifetime utility is a function of consumption during youth and old age. Each member
of generation t chooses the level of saving when young, St, that maximizes lifetime utility.
The relevant features of preferences are summarized in the level of saving per effective unit
of labor, sj = St/AtL, which we assume is given by
St = s{wt,rt), (2)
where rt denotes the interest rate between periods t and i + 1, s^, > 0, and < Sr < 00.
2.1.1 The long run feedback
In the Diamond (1965) model, there are no adjustment costs to capital so that rt = fk{kt+\)
and the stock of capital next period is equal to today's saving. Equilibrium then is charac-
terized by a nonlinear difference equation for capital accumulation:
^ ^
siw{kt),r{kt+i))
,g-
1+7
If the stability condition in Diamond (1965) is relaxed, then multiple steady-states as in
panel (a) of Figure 3 can arise. The essential feature of this saving function is that there is a
region where saving increases rapidly as capital rises. For now, we do not explain the source
of this feature but simply assume it.^ A particularly simple formulation of such situation is
°Note that even if one stays within purely neoclassical features, these need not be exotic. With the
technology we use here a log utility would violate the stability conditions.
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Figure 3: Multiple Steady States
to start with a saving function that is linear in k and r, with a step at some level of capital
k":
s{w{kt),rt) =
So + Skkt + Srn, k<k°;
(4)
So + (5 + Skh + Srn-, k > k°,
with So, 5 and Sj-O strictly positive. Now let the marginal product of capital be linear in
capital, TTo — tti/c, with ttq and tti strictly positive and k < tto/tti (henceforth, we will focus
on equilibria that satisfy this constraint), so that:
n = r{kt+i) = TTo - TTikt+i
Replacing this interest rate expression into the saving function (4), and the result into the
capital accumulation expression (3), solves the model. The following assumptions ensure
that we captm-e the scenario that concerns us.
Assumption 0: A = Sriri + (1 + 7 - s^) > and ^si+^ < A;°.
Assumption 1 (Minimum grovi^th-saving feedback): 5 > 5= [k^ — aid^iiim) /^
Assumption 1 states that the jump in the saving function at fc° must be high enough
for a steady state to exist to the right of k°.
Proposition 1 (Multiple Steady States)
If Assumption and 1 are satisfied, the economy has two steady states, A;" and k^ , with:
fc"
So + SrTTo ^ , o Sq + 5 + S^TTq , g<k° < = fc^A A
where the superscripts "n" and "s" stanrf /or normal and speculative, respectively.
(5)

Proof: See appendix A.
The proposition simply states that if the growth-saving feedback, captured here by the
parameter S, is sufficiently strong, the economy exhibits multiple steady states. This is
illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 3.
Importantly, since the marginal product of capital is decreasing in the stock of capital,
the speculative steady state exhibits a lower cost of capital than the normal steady state:
r* = r" -TTi— < r".A
This is the reason at times we refer to the "speculative" equilibrium as the "low cost of
capital" equilibrium. Similarly, since the valuation of an asset is simply its price divided by
earnings, and in steady state the former is just earnings divided by cost of capital, we have
that valuation is just one over the cost of capital. Thus we also refer to the "speculative"
equilibrium as the "high valuation equilibrium."
How can the economy have a low cost of capital in the speculative equilibrium when it
requires more saving to be sustained? Precisely because higher capital raises saving enough
to more than offset the reduction in saving due to the decline in interest rate resulting from
lower marginal product of capital (supply of funding shifts more than demand for funding).
This is at the core of the growth-funding mechanisms we discuss in this paper.
2.1.2 Multiple Equilibria
It is easy to see that while the model above has multiple steady states, it has a unique
equilibriuTTi. That is, for any given level of kt the economy converges to a specific steady
state. To see this, suppose the economy is at fc". Then moving toward /c* would require
increasing saving, which can only happen if the interest rate rises (since kt is given). But
this cannot be an equilibrium since a decreasing marginal product of capital implies that an
increase in the interest rate reduces investment. Conversely, suppose that the economy is at
fc*. Then moving toward A;" would require lowering saving, which requires the interest rate
to fall. But this cannot be an equilibrium either since a fall in the interest rate leads to more
rather than less investment. More generally, the same logic applies to any other level of
equilibrium capital: If a level of investment constitutes an equilibrium in the capital market
for a given level of capital, then no other level of investment (and hence of tomorrow's
capital) can be an equilibrium. The reason is simply that for any given kt, investment and
saving are, respectively, decreasing and increasing with respect to r^.
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Let us modify slightly the previous setup and introduce adjustment costs. This not
only creates the possibility of a stock market boom, which is one of the features we aim
to explain, but also breaks the short run connection between the return on investment and
the marginal product of capital (since there are capital gains), which was at the heart of
the uniqueness result above.
Let investment to maintain the effective capital stock be frictionless, but all deviations
from this level of investment be subject to a convex adjustment cost:^
ciIt,Kt) = \e-'Kt(J^^-j^ , (6)
where I is investment. As usual, the investment equation in this context takes the simple
qi-theory form:
x{qt) = 7 + S{qt - 1) (7)
where xt = It/Kt and qt is the price of a unit of installed capital. When adjustment costs
are large {6 low) , investment is relatively unresponsive to deviations of the value of installed
capital firom that of uninstalled capital. When they are low [9 large), investment is very
responsive to such deviations. The simple model in the previous section obtains when 6
goes to infinity. The capital accumulation equation can now be written as:
h,r^^^h=(l^-^i,,-l))k,. (8)1+7 V 1+7 /
Importantly, it is no longer the case that the interest rate is equal to the marginal
product of capital. A unit of installed capital costs qt and saves adjustment costs for
CK{It,Kt) today. This unit of capital yields qt+i and fk{kt+i) tomorrow. Thus, the return
from investing in capital is:
/, N ^ qt+i + fk{h+i)
^ ''
qt + CK{IuKt)-
After replacing /^ in it, this expression can be rearranged as:
qt+i = (1 + rt){qt + CKih, Kt)) - (ttq - 7rifct+i), (9)
with
CKiiuKt) ^ir^(i-7) -^-^(^-7)^
= \e-\xt-^f-e-\xt--i)xt
=
-(7 + i(9*-i))fe-i)-
^Subtracting effective-maintenance investment from the adjustment cost function facilitates our analysis
later on without any substantive cost.
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r{qu h) = — qt +
-t + 0{qt - 1) + ^{qt - 1)^ - Sk
The last step to fully specify the dynamic system, is to solve out the interest rate as
a function of qt and kt- For this, let us find the capital market equilibrium condition.
Following production in period t, the old sell their capital to the young at price qt- The
young allocate their saving to the purchase of the existing stock of capital, to invest in new
capital, and to pay for the adjustment costs of installing this new capital:
s{kt, n) = {qt + xt{qt))kt + c{x{qt),kt). (10)
Replacing (4), (6) and (7) into (10), and solving out for the interest rate, yields:
h-so- l{kt > k°}s\
, (11)
with l{fcf > k°} an indicator function that takes value one when kt > k° and zero otherwise.
Putting things together, the system governing equilibrium dynamics can be written as
a two-dimensional system in {kt, 5t)-space:
h+i= U + Y^(5t-l)jfci,
qt+i = {l + r{qu h)) (qt - f7 + :^{qt - 1) j {qt
- 1) j - Uo - tti (l + ^^(gt - 1) j hj .
It is straightforward to verify that this dynamic system has the same steady states
described in Proposition 1. For this, simply note that in steady state g = 1, in which case
the steady state equations of this system collapse to those of the model without adjustment
costs.
But the question that concerns us here is under which circumstances the presence of
adjustment costs can break the uniqueness result of the simpler model. In particular,
whether it is possible for an economy near its "natural" steady state to initiate a path
toward the "speculative" one. That is, whether the economy can embark in a "speculative
growth" path.
Let us assume that 6 is small so that we can make a first order approximation around
q — I and k = k"' for the transition from /c" to k^, if such transition is possible (see the
appendix for a precise statement about this approximation, which also requires that the
distance between k° and A:" be small). Let qt = {qt - 1) and kt = {kt — A;"), then the
linearized dynamic system can be written as:
qt+i = :i+o(i-7) + (j^ + ^^
12
qt + -kt-l{kt>k-}-, (12)
Of O-p

kt+i = -7-^qt + h. (13)1+7
In the appendix we provide the exact statements that make this hnear system the limit
of the nonhnear one as 5 and (fc" — k°) go to zero. In the main text, om: analysis refers to
the dynamic system described by (12) and (13). We shall add a technical condition that
ensures that the interest rate and marginal product, fk, rather than the adjustment cost
saving feature of investment, ck, dominates local dynamics for all values of 6:
Assumption 0' (Technical condition): ^ + (1 + r")(l - 7) - 1 >
It is useful to define the following function:
A(^) = -1 + 2- -, ,
1+7 ^^^^
which corresponds to the ratio of the slope of the unstable path stemming from the normal
steady state to (minus) the slope of the saddle path stemming from the speculative steady
state (see the Appendix). Observe that A is strictly positive, non-monotonic on [0, +oo[,
decreasing on [0,^] and increasing on [0, +oo[, with \im.g^Q K{9) — lim0^+ooA(0) — +cxd,
where
^ + (l + r")(l-7)-l
Assumption 1' (Minimum growth saving feedback for a trcinsition): 5 > ^ =
('a(^) + i) A(fcO-fc").
Note that since A(^) > 0, Assumption 1' implies Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 (Speculative adjustment costs region): 0_{5) < 9 < 9{5), with
m = ini{6 > 0, A{e) = -1 + ^(^^} and e{6) = sup{0 > 0, A(0) = -1 + ^^^^}.
Proposition 2 (Multiple Equilibria and Speculative Growth)
If Assumptions 0, 0', 1 ' and 2 hold, there is a speculative growth path that takes the economy
from fc" to k^ . Along that path, qt > 0.
Proof: See appendix A.
Let us discuss here the structure of the proof with the help of the phase diagrams in
Figure 4. The central ingredients in each of these panels are the unstable arm of the normal
13
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Figure 4: Multiple Equilibria
steady state, the vertical line at k°, and the stable arm (saddle path) of the speculative
steady state. Naturally, for a speculative growth path to exist, it must be the case that the
unstable path of the low capital equilibrium intersects the k° line below the intersection of
the latter and the saddle path of the high capital equilibrium. This is precisely the scenario
depicted in panel (a). By continuity, in this case there is a path starting at (/c",g"'") with
g"*" > 1, such that it hits k° at the saddle path of the speculative equilibrium.
Before further characterizing the speculative growth path, it is instructive to discuss
scenarios where the conditions for such path do not exist. Panels (b) and (c) in Figure 4
provide these examples. The former is one in which adjustment costs are too low (hence
6 > 6) while the latter represents the other extreme (hence 9 < 9)7
On one end, when adjustment costs are too low, the slope of the saddle path for the
speculative steady state is very fiat (small deviations of q from 1 lead to large investment
responses). On the other, when adjustment costs are too large, the slope of the unstable path
for the normal steady state is very steep (it takes enormous capital gains to justify costly
^The only reason Proposition 2 is not stated as an if and only if, is that since our linear system is an
approximation to the non-linear one, we cannot state whether a speculative growth path is feasible or not
when 9 is exactly at the boundaries of the range in Assumption 2. If the inequalities in Assumption 2 are
reversed, there is no speculative growth path (see the Appendix). The same consideration applies to most
of the Propositions in the main text.
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investment beyond maintenance investment). That is, for a speculative growth path to
exist, adjustment costs must be large enough to generate sufficient capital gains to decouple
the return on investment from the marginal product of capital in the short run, but not so
large that it is simply too costly to finance an investment boom.
Retm-ning to panel (a), we can see that along the speculative growth path the value of
installed capital is booming and with it are investment and growth. And since marginal prod-
uct is declining, the price-earnings ratios (valuations) are also rising. These are precisely
the features we highlighted in the introduction for the U.S. episode during the 1990s.
2.2 Fragility and crashes
Our use of the word "speculative" is primarily meant to capture the feedback between the
investment boom and capital gains along the path toward the high capital equilibrium. But
our framework also captures the meaning of "fragility" in that word.
Assumption 3 (Non-crash adjustment costs region): 6 ^ 0F{5),9 {5) , where
e^{5) = inf{^ > 0, K{e) - -1 +
^(fc^} and o"^ {5) = sup{^ > 0, A{e) = -1 + ^^J_^6) }.
Note that Assumption 3 is automatically satisfied if 5 < 5^ = (A{9) + 1] A{k^ — A;°),
where the superscript C stands for crash.
Proposition 3 (Consolidation region)
If Assumptions 0, 0', 1', 2 and 3 hold, there is a speculative growth path that takes the
economy from fc" to k^, but the converse is not true. Moreover, there is a value k'^ of the
capital stock, k° <k^ <k^ , such that there is a unique equilibrium for kt > k'^ and multiple
equilibria for k^ <kt <k'^.
Proof: See appendix A.
The first part of the proposition is literally Proposition 2. The second part is that at
A;*, there is no path that can take the economy back to fc". The structure of the proof
is similar to that used in Proposition 2, now to show that when Assumption 3 does not
hold, the unstable path from the high capital equilibrium overshoots the saddle path to the
low capital equilibrium. The last part of the proposition raises an interesting feature: The
economy has a consolidation region. That is, a region around the high capital steady state
such that once the economy reaches it, there is no chance of a crash that takes the economy
back to the low capital equilibrium. The other side of the coin is that, early on, an economy
along a speculative path is fragile and susceptible to crashes.
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2.3 A Detour: Sunspots
Of course the concepts of crashes and fragility in a model with multiple but deterministic
paths are imprecise at best. But it is conceptually straightforward to introduce a sunspot
as an equilibrium-selection device, and formalize these statements.
Suppose, for example, that in the multiple equilibria region the sunspot variable is a
Markov chain with two states, {u,d}, and initial value eo = u. When the state is u, all
agents coordinate their expectations on the speculative growth path. When the state is d,
expectations coordinate on the path toward the low capital steady state. Define the crash
time, Td'.
Td = inf{t > 0,et = d},
and let the transition probabilities be such that once a crash takes place, the economy
converges to the low capital equilibrium with probability one:
Puu Pud _ IJ- 1- fl
Pdu Pdd 1
Finally, suppose that preferences are such that only the expected return of a project
matters to agents (we can use Epstein-Zin preferences for this purpose). With this structure,
sunspots do not alter the expression defining the equilibrium interest rate. All that is
modified is the expression for expected future price of capital while in the speculative
growth path (and not yet in the consolidation region), which is now [fJ-qt^i + (1 — ii)qf_^_i)
instead of simply qt+i-
For expositional simplicity, we henceforth suppress sunspots from our formal analysis
but still use the language of crashes associated to them.^ Alternatively, our analysis can be
thought of as being conducted in the neighborhood of /x = 1.
3 Bubbles, Assets in Fixed Supply, and Speculative Growth
Assume momentarily that the speculative steady state is dynamically inefficient, with r* <
7. It is well known from Tirole (1985) that rational bubbles can emerge in such scenario.
Essentially, since a bubble must grow at the interest rate, and the latter is below the rate
of growth of the economy, a bubble in this environment never outgrows the economy. Thus,
if it is feasible at the outset, it remains so at later dates. Moreover, rational bubbles in this
* Similarly, we do not model the jump onto a speculative path. We could do so with entirely symmetric
sunspot arguments.
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context are welfare enhancing since they solve an "excessive" investment problem driven by
a high demand for a store of value rather than by productivity considerations. It follows
that the emergence of a rational bubble in this context lowers aggregate investment, and
that a crash of the bubble boosts aggregate investment.
Now assume that the low capital long run equilibrium, A;", is dynamically efficient. In
steady state, this means r" > 7. It is also well known from Tirole (1985) that rational bub-
bles cannot exist in such environment. If the interest rate exceeds the rate of growth of the
economy, a bubble grows faster than the economy until it eventually becomes inconsistent
with the aggregate endowment constraint. Backward induction then shows that a rational
bubble can simply not emerge in this region.
The fact that most evidence point in the direction of dynamic efficiency in the U.S.
(Abel et al (1989)) and that episodes of speculative growth as illustrated in Figure 1 exhibit
strong positive comovement between valuations and investment, would seem to be conclusive
evidence against the presence of rational bubbles during these episodes. It turns out that
neither property needs to hold in our speculative growth environment. Along a speculative
growth path bubbles may emerge even in the region where the interest rate exceeds the
rate of growth of the economy. Moreover, aggregate investment and the bubble experience
positive comovement. The speculative growth path is needed for a bubble to emerge, and if
the economy crashes into the recessionary path toward the low capital equilibrium, so will
the bubble. Importantly, the likelihood of such crash is enhanced by the emergence of a
bubble.
3.1 Bubbles with r > 7
Assumption 4 (Bubble region): ttq — tti/c" > 7 > ttq — tti/c"
Proposition 4 (Bubbles in high interest region)
Let Assumptions 0, 0', 1', 2 and 4 hold, and initial capital be equal to fc". Then, if the
economy initiates a speculative growth path, there will a range of feasible rational bubbles
(normalized by A{t)), bt, such that bo > and
u 1 + ^U
1+7
Proof: See appendix B.
This result is intuitive. While at the outset of the speculative growth path the economy
is in a region where the interest rate exceeds the rate of growth of the economy, it is headed
toward a dynamically inefficient region where bubbles can be sustained. But then, by
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backward induction, bubbles can start before the economy reaches that region. All that is
required is that the initial bubble be sufficiently small so that despite its fast early growth,
it reaches the dynamically inefficient region with a size consistent with the bounds imposed
by the size of the economy, and that it allows capital to grow and reach that region.
a: Paths of q and k with and without bubbles b: Path of the bubble
Figure 5: Bubbles
Figure 5 shows one such example. Panel (a) illustrates the paths of q and k for two
economies along a speculative path, one with and the other without a rational bubble. Panel
(b) illustrates the path of the bubble.
3.2 Bubbles and crashes
Proposition 5 (Bubbles and fragility)
Let Assumptions 0, 0', 1 ', 2, 3 and 4 hold, and initial capital be equal to A;". Then, the length
of time an economy along a speculative growth path remains outside the consolidation region
(and hence is susceptible to a crash), is increasing with respect to the size of the bubble, bt-
Proof: See appendix B.
The reason for this result is intuitive as well. As in the standard model, a bubble
competes for savings with physical investment. This means that in the presence of a bubble,
the economy transits more slowly from fc" to fc* all along the path, which also means that
it takes longer for the economy to reach the consolidation region, k> k'^. Note that while a
bubble still crowds out investment, it now exhibits positive rather than negative comovement
with aggregate investment. In particular, the bubble can only emerge when the investment
is booming along a speculative path. And if the latter crashes, so will the bubble.
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Figure 6: Mechanisms in the US Epidode
4 Mechanisms in the US Episode
Sections 2 and 3 have described an environment that is conducive to speculative growth
episodes that resemble those portrayed in Figmre 1. At the core of this result is optimism
about future effective funding of large capital accumulation. In this section we discuss a
few prominent features of the US economy during the 1990s that supported this optimism:
Fiscal sm-pluses, capital flows, and technological progress in the equipment sector.
4.1 Fiscal surpluses
The fiscal surpluses generated during the U.S. speculative growth experience were the com-
bined result of fiscal consolidation measures and the automatic effect of procyclical tax
revenues in a booming environment. The reduction in public debt had a moderating effect
on interest rates in the short run and substituted for increased private saving to fund the
investment boom. It is in this sense that a tight policy of paying down the national debt
supported the boom in the short term. Turning to the more novel issue of longer-term
sustainability, we argue that a continuing policy rule of generating fiscal surpluses provides
critical support to the speculative equilibrium.
To develop our argument, we add a government to the model. We assume the govern-
ment taxes wage income at a rate r* and spends gtAtL on goods that do not enter agents'
utility function. Thus the government's budget constraint is
(1 + '))dt+i = (1 + rt)[dt - [Ttwt - gt)], (14)
where dt = Dt/AtL denotes public debt per unit of effective labor.
Adding the public sector alters two equations in the model. The saving of the young St
,
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is now a function of after-tax wages:
st = s{{l-Tt)w{kt),rt)
, (15)
while the capital-maxket equihbrium condition is now given by
{Ttwt - gt) + st=dt + {qt + x{qt)) h + c{x{qt),kt). (16)
The saving of the government and of the young must fund the purchase of the existing
pubhc debt and capital stock from the old, and new investment. Combined, equations (15)-
(16) implicitly define a new interest rate function rt = r{kt,qt,dt,Tt,gt)- The economy's
dynamics are described by system (8)-(9) with the new interest rate function together with
the government budget constraint, (14), and a fiscal policy rule.
Let us consider a benchmark fixed-parameters policy rule under which detrended government
spending and the tax rate are fixed at g > and r > 0. To facilitate comparisons, we assume
that this and other policy rules result in a balanced budget in the low-valuation steady state
— which requires g — tw" — and, therefore, result in the same low valuation steady state.
The important point to notice is that this fixed-parameters policy creates primary siurpluses
during expansions beyond fc" and primary deficits diu'ing contractions. To see this, note
that the fiscal rule implies that the primary goverrmient surplus, {rivt — 5), increases with
Wt in an expansion. Thus the response of the combined "gross" saving of government and
the young to an increase in wages is given by (t + Su)(l — r)) dwt-
The increase in saving generated by the fixed-parameters rule not only facilitates the
funding of investment in the short run but, more importantly, plays a central role in fa-
cilitating the emergence of a speculative growth scenario. This feasibility point is made
most clearly by focusing on the speculative steady state, {k'^, 1), rather than on the entire
path. One can show that if, instead of being fixed, government spending is raised with the
endogenous increase in the wage, then aggregate saving falls and so does the level of fc*. In
fact this fiscal expansion experiment is similar to reducing 6 in Section 2. For a high enough
indexation of fiscal spending to wages, the speculative equilibrium is no longer feasible. In
other words, fiscal surpluses are not only a symptom of the speculative growth episode, but
also can be a central element of the factors that support it.
The notion that the fiscal sm-pluses generated by the speculative equilibrium can be
partly spent or rebated to the taxpayer may be an illusion. The surpluses could be a pillar
of the speculative equilibrium, and might swiftly disappear if this equilibrium umravels —
giving rise to what one might describe as a surplus illusion.
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The following proposition summarizes our results:^
Proposition 6 (Surplus Illusion)
Let Assumptions 0, 0', 1', 2 and 4 hold. Let gt — 9 + oif{wt — w"") . If the economy has two
saddle-path steady state equilibria for a = 0, there exists an a™ > such that for any a >
a'", the speculative equilibrium disappears. An upper bound for a™ is max{:;p^ fcO-fc" (* ~
A
Proof: See appendix C.
Importantly, the parameter a"* is less than one for a wide configuration of parameters.
4.2 Capitcd flows
The other major source of funding for the investment boom in the U.S. was the current
account. As a short-term funding mechanism, international capital flows can moderate the
rise in interest rates needed to fund the investment boom. Over time, the whole world may
be dragged into a speculative path.^^
We capture the key role played role by capital flows in facilitating a speculative growth
episode with a stark contrast. One in which no such episode will be feasible without the
presence of external saving. For this purpose, let us assume that the closed economy saving
function does not depend on the interest rate, Sr = 0. In this case, if the home country
were in autarky, the transition from the normal steady state to the speculative one would
be impossible. This is because saving, and therefore investment, are fully determined by
/;", with no role for interest rates in facilitating an investment boom.
Let us now introduce a simple foreign country. In it, the young receive an aggregate
endowment Cj = 6(1 + 7)* in each period, which they save in full. The economy also has a
technology that uses only capital to produce consumption goods:
FiZt) = ^tf(j-) = Ajizt); f > 0,7" < 0,
where (foreign) capital Zt is accumulated without adjustment costs. Because this produc-
tion function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, there are quasi-rents which accrue to an
'in the proposition, we also add the condition that the speculative equilibrium be dynamically inefficient
in order to avoid explosive assets or debt. This is necessary only because we are analyzing simple linear
fiscal rules.
'"Ventura (2001) emphasizes an alternative portfolio channel connecting the current account and a do-
mestic bubble. In his model, the m.ain effect of the bubble is to raise domestic wealth. As domestic agents
attempt to rebalance their portfolios by investing in non-bubbly domestic equity, external borrowing rises
to finance the investment that is required to build domestic equity.
21

unmodeled factor of production, which does not save (this is not important). Let the mar-
ginal product of capital from this technology be linear in capital, ttq — niz, with ttq and
TTi strictly positive and z < tto/tti (henceforth, we will focus on equilibria that satisfy this
constraint). Since capital markets are integrated, it must be that:
n = r{zt+i) = n^- Trizt+i (17)
Equilibrium in global capital market is now:
s{kt) + e = {qt + xt{qt))kt + c{x{qt), kt) + (l + 7)2;t+i, (18)
while the arbitrage and capital accumulation equations for k are still given by (9) and (8).
We can now solve zt+i out from (17):
Zt+l = —^=;— -
and replace it in (18) to obtain an effective saving function (by which here we mean saving
available for investment in fc):
It is now straightforward to see that with Sq — sq + e — '^°y^V ^ sf, — Sk and s^ — ^^ , we
can fully reproduce the analysis of Section 2 with s^{kt,rt) replacing s{kt,rt) in Section's
2 formulae. In particular, the domestic economy now can initiate a speculative path which
would have been infeasible in autarky.
Early on in this path, the interest rate rises, and foreign saving flows into the home
economy while foreign output declines. Over time, as the growth-saving feedback gains in
strength, the domestic economy pulls the foreign economy by reversing the capital flows.
Interestingly, as it may have played an important role during the 1990s, the mechanism
above also implies that if there is an exogenous decline in foreign opportunities, this may
facilitate a transition into a speculative episode in the home economy. Furthermore, if the
transition comes together with the decline in opportunities abroad, interest rates need not
rise in the short run either.
Let us suppose that with s^{kt,rt) replacing s{kt,rt), Assumptions 0, 0' and 1 hold but
Assumption 2 does not hold, so that no transition from the normal steady state to the
speculative steady state is possible. Consider a situation where the economy is initially in
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the low steady state. Let us now imagine that e and ttq unexpectedly shift to e* > e and
TTo' < TTo, SO that Sq shifts to Sq = Sq + (e' — e) — (ttq' — ttq)^^ >Sg.
Assumption 5: A(A;° - A;") > sg' - sg > A(fc° - A;") -
^x^^+i) > ^
This assumption implies that there are two steady states under the new parameters.
Denote them by fc^ = fc„ + ^^^and k'^ = ks +^^^.
Proposition 7 (Change in conditions in the rest of the world)
If Assumption 5 holds, there is no transition from fc" to fc* under the parameters e and
tTq. By contrast, there are multiple equilibria under the parameters e and tt'q: starting
with capital stock fc", there is a saddle path that takes the economy from fc" to k^ and a
speculative growth path that takes the economy from A;" to k^ . Along these paths, qt > 0.
The result is intuitive. If saving in the foreign country increase or if the rate of return
in the foreign country decreases, causing a reallocation of saving to the domestic economy,
a speculative growth scenario can emerge where it would have been impossible before the
shift.
4.3 Technologiccd progress in the equipment sector
The productivity growth that came with technological progress was exceptional. After
two disappointing decades beginning with the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the economy
recovered more than half of its lost productivity growth. Most prominently, productivity
growth in industrial and electronic machinery accelerated from an annual rate of 2% for
1973—1990 to more than 6% for 1995-2000. This acceleration reduced the price of machinery
and electronic devices, which in turn contributed to the investment boom. This mechanism
fits within the speculative growth perspective we have highlighted up to now, once one
broadens the definition of funding to that of effective funding. That is, for any given level
of saving, a decline in the price of new capital raises the power of that saving to build the
economy's stock of capital.
While some of the technological progress in equipment producing sectors may have been
exogenous to the capital deepening process itself, we continue here with our endogenous
perspective (which in any event would act as a multiplier to the exogenous shocks). We
capture this endogeneity through a positive spillover from the capital accumulation process
to the production of equipment goods. ^^ This simple channel allows us to preserve much of
^^See Murphy et al. (1989) for a model of this sort based on increasing returns in the equipment sector,
and Jaimovich (2003) for a countecyclical markups version.
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our previous formulae. Moreover, here we set 5 = as the technological spillover ends up
playing a similar role in the current model.
We assume that the technology in the equipment goods sectors can transform one unit of
consumption goods into X{k) units of equipment goods (with A' > 0). Perfect competition
in this sector ensures that the price of equipment goods is:
Since qt corresponds to Tobin's q — that is as the value of a unit of installed capital over
the price on a new (uninstalled) unit of capital — we preserve the formulae of Section 2,
with two exceptions: the capital market equilibrium condition and the arbitrage equation.
The former is now:
s{kt,rt) ^ p(kt){qt + xt{qt))kt + pikt)c{x{qt),kt). (19)
But is apparent that by dividing both side of this condition by p{kt) and defining the
effective funding function as:
P(, \ _ s{kt,rt)sP[kt,rt) =
P{h)
'
we can rewrite (19) as:
s^ikun) = {qt + xt{qt))kt + c{x{qt),kt), (20)
which is entirely analogous to the equilibrium capital market condition in Section 2.
Moreover, suppose that we model the aggregate increasing returns aspect of the equip-
ment sector as a simple step function:
P*) = ^'
''"'°^
(21)
1 P < 1, k> k°.
then (1 — p) > is isomorphic to 5 in terms of the effective funding or saving function.
The only difference with the model in Section 2 is that (1 - p) affects not only effective
funding, but also the arbitrage equation, since now:
,, , w
,
,r T.- W PJ^t) (TTQ-TTlfct+l) . ,
...1 = (1 + n){qt + ck{Iu
^^))^(^^ - p(fc,^,) • (22)
However, nothing of our fundamental message is changed by this modification. In particular,
the pre-conditions and features of the speculative path remain valid. We prove these claims
in Appendix C.3.
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5 Financial Constraints and Growth-funding feedbacks
Another key ingredient in the US episode is the reallocation of funding toward small growth
firms in new technology sectors. We develop this model here with two purposes. First, to
show that a growth-funding mechanism need not operate through aggregate saving; the
reallocation of funds can play a similar role. Second, to show a more explicit model of 6;
here the growth-funding feedback stems from the relaxation of financial constraints brought
about by the expansion.
Let us simplify interest rate determination by assuming that there is a constant returns
to capital, h, sector with (low) productivity r, which is always active so that the "riskless"
interest rate is pinned down at r.
More substantively, assume that only a fraction yu < 1 of the new born can invest and
work in the conventional sector described in Section 2, while the rest of the young (lenders)
work in a sector that has no capital. Thus, aggregate output is:
Yt = At{^^Lf{kt) + {l-^l)L + rht).
Young lenders have undiscounted log-utility preferences, so they save half of their wages,
which in aggregate amounts to (1 — m)/2. We assume that (1 — n) is large enough so their
saving is never binding in equilibrium. Entreprenem:s, on the other hand, satisfy a minimum
(detrended) consumption c, after which they save and invest as much as they can:
fj,{w{kt) -c).
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs borrow from lenders, df.
dt = {xt + qt + l^'H^t - lf)h - KHh) - c). (23)
Against this loans, entrepreneurs post as collateral the capital they acquire:
qt+ih/Ci- + r).
Neither new investment nor output can be pledged (this is our financial constraint). Col-
lateralized loans are made at the "riskless" interest rate r. Uncollateralized loans consume
(per unit) S/sr resources in monitoring and therefore are made at interest rate r -I- 6/sr-
For a given interest rate, neither the accumulation equation nor the arbitrage condition
described in Section 2 change in this model. The main change is in the criterion separating
the two regions of the phase diagram. Rather than k°, now there is a condition that splits
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the region according to whether the marginal loan is collateralized (and hence at rate r) or
not (and hence at rate r + 6). For this purpose, let us define
_ ,
qt+ih
nt = dt- -——
.
1 + r
By replacing (23), the arbitrage condition, and the accumulation equation into this expres-
sion, we obtain:
nt - (7+g(gt-l)+^(gt-l)^)fc.-M(^(fct)-c)+(^^(g,-l)^+^7(g^-l)+ /t" ^)^^2 1 + r 2 I + r 1 + r
When n{qt, kt) < the interest rate is r, while when n^ > the interest rate is r + 5/sr.
We are now in the setting of Section 2 with only a slightly more complicated function
separating the two regions of the phase diagram. Note that if nj — 0, then rt = r. Using
this and simplifying, the separating region is defined by the following equation
= [7 + (^ + 7) {qt - 1) + 0{qt - If] kt-fi {w{kt) -c)+ /+^ -I
1 + r
Financial constraints with intermediate adjustment costs
Figure 7: Financial Constraints
Figure 7 illustrates the analogue of panel (a) in Figure 4. As before, there are two
steady states and the possibility of a speculative growth path. The key funding-growth
feedback now arises from the fact that the financial constraint is no longer binding when k
is sufficiently large, which significantly drops the interest rate on loans. Appendix D proves
the main claims in this section; in particular, it reproduces the main result of the paper in
the context of this model.
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6 Welfare
Do speculative growth episodes represent a Pareto improvement across generations involved
in it? The answer to this question is not generic, as it depends on the specific channel behind
the growth funding feedback. For example, in the financial constraints model of the previous
section the answer is yes. But it needs not be the case if (5 is a property of the aggregate
saving function as some savers after t° (the time at which kt first reaches k°) are hurt by
the sharp decline in interest rates.
6.1 Generic results
But what is generic in our models is the welfare improvement of all generations born before
t°. It is also generic that if the economy is dynamically efficient then all generations with
capital close enough to the high capital equilibrium are also better off. We summarize these
results in two propositions, and explain them through their short proofs.
Proposition 8 (Welfare for early generations)
Let the conditions for the multiple equilibria outcome in the cannonical model in Section
2 hold. Then all generations t < t° are better off along a speculative path than in the low
capital steady state.
Proof:
The basket consumed by individuals of generation t in the low capital steady state is
affordable along the speculative growth path if:
1 + r"
u;^ > u;" _ 5" + i"^-!— (24)
1 + rt
where s" denotes detrended savings by an individual in the low capital equilibrium.
For generations t <tQ, which are the ones that concern us in this proposition, we have
rt > r" since qt > 1, kt > fc", r^ > and rq > 0, and wt > Wn since kt > fe" and Wk > 0.
Therefore, (24) is always verified for these generations.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 9 (Welfare for late generations)
Let the conditions for the multiple equilibria outcome in the cannonical model in Section 2
hold. Then if the speculative steady state is dynamically efficient (r* > -y), all generations
near the speculative steady state are better off than in the normal steady state. Conversely,
if i~^ < (1 +7)|^ ~ 1' then all generations near the speculative steady state are worse off
than in the normal steady state.
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Observe that (1 + 7)|^ - 1 < 7.
Proof:
For generations t > t°, whether the key inequality in the previous proposition is satisfied
is ambiguous. We still have wt > w^ but now the sign of rt — r" is ambiguous.
The capital market equilibrium condition in the low equilibrium is
s" = (g" + x" + \d-\x^ - 7)2)A;" = (1 + 7)A;".
In the speculative steady state, we can rewrite (24) as
/(F) - F/'(F) - /(fc") - fc"/'(fc") > Y^T^fc" (/'(^") - /'(fc^)) (25)
Since / is strictly concave, we have that
{}e - k^)f'{k') < f{k') - /(fc") < {k' - k^)f'{k^).
Therefore,
k'^ifik^) - /'(F)) < f{k') - k^f'{k') - /(fc") - k^f'ik") < k'{f'{k^) - f'{kn).
Assume first that r* = fik") > 7. Then
Y^^^" (/'(fc") - f'ikn) < k- (/'(fc-) - /'(F))
,
so that (25) is verified with a strict inequality. Since limt^+00 wt = w^ and limt_>+oo n — r^,
this proves the first claim in the proposition.
Assume now that r* = /'(fc*) < (1 + 7)|^ - 1. Then
3^i^/c" (/'(F) - /'(F)) > F (/'(F) - /'(F))
,
so that (25) is violated. This proves the second claim in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
6.2 A comment on Bubbles cind Welfare
In the classic model of rational equilibrium bubbles, the latter are good because they reduce
the overaccumulation problem of a dynamically efficient economy. This welfare enhancing
features of bubbles runs counter most observers intuition during speculative growth episodes.
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Our model shares that positive side of bubbles for generations very late in the speculative
growth episode but they have a negative side as well: they overexpose the economy to crashes
by delaying the arrival of the consolidation phase. ^^
In other words, if bubbles emerge late in the process once the economy has already
arrived to the consolidation region, they are more likely to be beneficial. But bubbles that
arise early in the speculative growth path risk derailing this potentially prosperous process.
7 Final Remarks
This paper builds a theoretical framework for thinking about episodes of speculative growth.
We characterize this phenomenon as a low effective cost-of-capital equilibrium based on
optimism about the future availability of funds for investment. Our framework highlights
the key short-term and long-term funding mechanisms necessary to sustain a speculative
growth equilibrium.
Ours is not a framework of "irrational exuberance," although it offers a natural inter-
pretation of such episodes. These occur when a speculative growth path is not backed by a
long-run funding mechanism strong enough to eventually validate the capital gains dynam-
ics that are needed in the short run to reallocate resources toward the sectors that drive the
boom. A prototypical example is when investment and speculation focus on the "wrong"
sector, as it may have been the case in Japan during the 1980s with its large real estate
boom.
The U.S. experience during the 1990s probably had elements of both: A rational spec-
ulative growth component built on the information technology sector, sound fiscal policy,
and foreigners' confidence, as well as some elements of irrationality especially during the
late 1990s. Prom this perspective, it is not at all clear whether much of the U.S. asset
markets boom during the 1990s, even if bubbly, was condemned to be reversed. On this
regard, an interesting question that we leave for future research is whether a central bank
should attempt to raise interest rates upon the emergence of bubbles. It may well be the
case that doing so not only crashes the bubbles but also the underling, and mostly welfare
enhancing, speculative growth episode.
'"Note that this postponement has a distributional effect as well as it extends the number of generations
before t°, which are unambiguously better off with the speculative growth episode.
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A Proof of Propositions in Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1:
The conditions for a steady state are q = 1, r = TVo — nik, sq + s^k + Sr'r + l{k > k°}6 =
(1 + 7)fc. /c" < A:° is a steady state if and only if A:" = ^ai^ < k°. This inequality holds
by Assumption 0. Similarly k^ > k^ is a steady state if and only if k^ — '^—— > fc°.
This last inequality holds by Assumption 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let qt = {qt — 1) and kt = {h — k"), then the linearized dynamic system around the
normal steady state can be written as:
Qt+i (l+0(l-7) 1+7 Sr qt + TTi +
1 + 7 - Sfc
kt
0j^n ^
h+1 = 7—
—
Qt + kf1+7
This system is characterized by the following 2x2 matrix:
n =
(l+r")(l-7) +^ + ^A;" tti +^ Sk-
1+7
The two eigenvalues A"*" and A of fi are real since the discriminant D of det(f) — xl) is
positive:
D TTl^fc" + 1(l + r")(l-7) +f^ +1 + 7 fc" + 4 7ri + 1 ^ >0.Sr 1 + 7
A"*" and A are given by
A+ = l +
and
A- = 1 +
(l+r")(l-7)+^+^fc"-l+/ d+rn)(l-7)+^ + ^fc"-l V4(.,+i±2^)|^
2
(l+r-)(l-7)+^^+^fc"-l-y (l+.")(l-7)+^+^fe"-i; %4(.,+i±2^)|^
It is straightforward to check that
A" < 1< A+.
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Let us denote by (x+, 1) and {x , 1)', the corresponding eigenvectors:
+ A+ - 1 „
1+7
X =
X' - 1
gfc"
1+7
<0.
This shows that the normal steady state (fc", 1) is a saddle point.
Similarly, let qf = {qt — 1) and kf = {kt — A;*). Then the linearized dynamic system
around the speculative steady state can be written as:
9t+i (1 + r'){l - 7) + ( 3^ + 1 fe'
fc:
+ 7 s.
ek'
q! + TTi
1+7-Sfc
fc?
t+1 1+7* *
This system is characterized by the following 2x2 matrix:
Q = (l + r^)(l-7) +^ + ^fc« 7ri +
i±^
1+7
The two eigenvalues A®"*" and A* of fi* are real since the discriminant D^ of det{Q.^ — xl)
is positive:
(1 + r')(l - 7 +-^ + fc* - 11+7 Sr
D
A*"*" and A*~ are given by
1 + 7-Sfc, ek'
+ 4 TTi + '-
-)r^ > 0-
Sr 1+7
A*+ = 1 +
and
A"- = 1 +
It is straightforward to check that
(l+r-)(l-7)+^+^fc^-l+
^
a+r^)(i-7)+^+^fc^-i; V4(.i +i±I^)f^
2
(l+r^)(l-7)+^+^fe--l-y a+'-^)(l-7)+^+^fe=-l]'+4(7ri+i±^)f^
A"- < 1< A"+.
Let us denote by (x**"*", 1) and (x*~, 1)', the corresponding eigenvectors:
1+7
A^- - 1
1+7
<0.
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This shows that the speculative steady state (fc*, 1) is a saddle point.
Let us now fix A;", sq, Sr, ttq, tti, 7 and 6, and let us vary k^ and 5 such that assumptions
and 1 are verified and |fc° — /i;"| > e5 for some e > 0.
As we do this, k^, x*"*", x*~, A*"*" and A*~ also vary. These variables are all continuous
functions of S, and do not depend on fc° as long as assumptions and 1 are verified. Let us
denote them by k'{6), x*+(<5), x'-{S), X'+iS) and X'-{5). It is clear that k'{5) = A;" + 0(<5),
x'+{5) =x+ + 0{5), x'-{S) - X- + 0(6), \'+{6) = A+ + 0(6) and X'-{d) = A" + 0{S).
We will prove the following result. If ^_~i < ^0 ~^„ , then a transition is possible for 6
small enough, and that if ^_. j > ^aZ^n then for 5 small enough, no transition is possible.
Because the dynamic system we consider is twice continuously differentiable in the
regions k < k^ and k > k^, the following results hold:
-there exists S > such that for all 5 < 5, there exist continuously differentiable
functions q^~ : [fc°, k^] —> [1, +00 [ and 5^"+ : [A;", fc°] -^ [1, +00 [ such that the stable manifold
of {k^{S), 1) is parameterized by (A;, g|~(fc)) in the region k 6 [k^,k^(d)], and the unstable
manifold of (A;", 1) is parameterized by (A;, q^~^{k)) in the region k e [A:", k^\.
-there exists 5 > 5 > and m > such that for all 5 < 5 and A; e [k^,k^{5)], and
A;'g [A;",A;°],
|g|-(fc) - 1 - x'~{5){k - k'{5))\ < m5'^
and
|g"+(A;')-l-x+(A;-fc")| < m^^
Using the fact that k'{5) ^ k^ + 0{5), x'+{5) = x+ + 0{5), x'-{5) = x' + 0(<5),
A^+(5) = A+ + 0{5) and A^~(5) = A" + 0{5), we see that there exists ^>l>OandM>0
such that for alU <1 and A; e [A;°, A:^((5)], and k' G [A;", A;°],
|9|-(A;) - 1 - X- (A; - k\5))\ < M6^
and
|9"+(A:') - 1 - x+(A; - A:")| < McJ^.
The condition for a transition from the normal steady state to the speculative steady
state to be possible is that the intersection of the unstable arm of the normal steady state
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with the vertical k = ko line lies below the intersection of stable arm (the saddle path) of
the speculative steady state with the vertical k = ko line.
Theq= 1 +a;+(A;- fc") line intersects the k = k^ line at the point (fc°, l + a;+(fc° - fc")).
Similarly the q = l+x~{k-k^{S)) line intersects the k — k^ line at the point (A;°, l+x~(fc° —
k^{S))). Therefore, if 5 <5,& necessary condition for the intersection of the unstable arm
of the normal steady state with the vertical k = ko line to lie below the intersection of stable
arm (the saddle path) of the speculative steady state with the vertical k = ko line is
1 + x-{k^ - k'{5)) + M5^ > 1 + a;+(A; - A;") - MS"^. (26)
Similarly, a siifRcient condition is
1 + x-(fc° - k'{5)) -M5^>1 + x+{k - fc") + M6^. (27)
We can rewrite (26) and (27) as
A+ - 1 k^-k° 2M5'^
< T7^ TT +
1 - A" A;0 - A;" k^ - fc"
and
A+ - 1 k' - fcO 2M5^
<
1 - A" fcO - A;" /fcO - k"--
Using the fact that we have kept k^ — k'^ > eS, we see that a necessary condition for a
transition when 5 < (5 is
A+ - 1 k'- k° 2M5
<
1 - A" fco - fc" £
and that a sufficient condition for a transition is
A+ - 1 k' -k° 2M5
l-\- ^ k° - fc" e~'
Notice that^ ^ when 6^0.
This shows that if ^_~i <
^oZfcn > then a transition is possible for 6 small enough,
and that if ^_~i > I^Zpr then for 5 small enough, no transition is possible. Let us now
reexamine this condition.
We have that
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— = -1 + 2-
1- A" ]
= AW-
1+-;
4(^i +^±i^)f|^
Wl+rn)(l-r)+^^+^k'^-l\
A is a decreasing function of
T =
4(vr, + l±I^)i^
T is non-monotonic in 6. It is increasing in the interval (0, 9) and decreasing in the
interval (^, +oo), where
Ml
Sr + (l + r")(l-7)-l
In addition lim^^o T = 0, and lime^+oo T = O.As a result, A is non-monotonic in 6.
It is decreasing on (0, 9) and increasing on {9, +oo), and reaches a minimum for 9 = 9. In
addition, we have limg^o A — -l-oo and lime_>_)_oo A = -|-oo.
Q.E.D.
This shows that if ^_~i < ^o~^„ , then a transition is possible for S small enough, and
that if ^_~i > ^o~^„ then for S small enough, no transition is possible. In the rest of the
appendix, we will often have to go through a similar argument. We will not go through the
same details and instead state directly the equivalent of the condition ^Zl >
^oZfcn - The
only exception concerns the discussion of bubbles where more complex issues arise.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The condition for a transition from the speculative steady state to the normal steady
state to be possible is that the intersection of the unstable arm of the speculative steady
state with the vertical k = ko line lies above the intersection of stable arm (the saddle path)
of the normal steady state with the vertical k — ko line.
Going through the same arguments as in the proof of proposition 2, the condition for a
transition for 5 small enough and fc* — fc° > e'5 can be expressed as:
,
... A+ - 1 A;0 - fc"
Q.E.D.
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B Proof of Propositions in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 4:
In principle, there could be a third steady state once bubbles are feasible: {k'', 1, b), where
TTo — TTifc'' = 7 and 6 > 0. Assumption 4 guarantees that this steady state does not exist. To
see why, assume the contrary. It is clear from assumption 4 that fc^ < k^. But the associated
bubble in this steady state would be negative, since b = so+s^ttq- Afc'' < so+Sr7ro—AA;" = 0,
which is a contradiction.
In the proof of this proposition, we have to perform two linearizations, one around
the normal steady state and one around the speculative steady state. This is because
the characteristics of the dynamic system are different around the two steady states. The
normal steady state has a two-dimensional unstable manifold and a one-dimensional stable
manifold, whereas the speculative steady state has a one-dimensional unstable manifold and
a two-dimensional stable manifold.
We consider the possibility of a small initial bubbles, < 6o < MbS for some Mb > 0,
A+-1 k'-k°and show that if ^_~i < prEf^r , then there exists m^ > such that a transition is possible
for S small enough and < 6o < mb6, and that if ^_~i > ^o~^„ then for 5 small enough,
for every m^ > 0, there exists < 6o < ffibS such that no transition is possible with initial
bubble 6o-
Let us first linearize the system around the normal steady state. Up to second order
terms in gi = (qt - 1) , kt — {h - fc"), n = {rt — r"), bt = bt and 5 we have that
Qt+i =
bt+i =
•+1 l + T-Sfcr^ ir
k"qt -\ h H bt,
by O 7" by
(1 + r")(l - 7) + -r-.— + A;"1-^7
1+1
1-hr"
1-^7
Qt + h
bt.
qt + TTi -I-
1 + 7 - Sfc
kt -\ bt,
Similarly, we linearize the system around the speculative steady state. Up to second
order terms in ^ = (qt — 1) , kt = (kt — k^), n — {n — r*), bt — bt and 6, we have that
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n =
qt+i =
k''qt H kt H h,
Of Of Of
(1 + r")(l - 7) + T-!-— + A;*
1 + 7
qt + TTi +
l + J-Sk h H bt,
9k'
qt + kt
1 + 7
—
-
1 + r* -
^t+i = T";
—
h-
1 + 7
The dynamic system around the normal steady state is characterized by the matrix
fi" =
(l+r")(l-7) +^ + ^/c" TTi + to. i
1
i±^
^ 1+7
1+7
Similarly, the dynamic system around the speculative steady state is characterized by
the matrix
Q.'
(l + r^)(l-7) +^ + ^A;^ tti + i±^ \
r^ 1
Q 1+r1+7
Keeping the same notations as above, it is clear that the eigenvalues of Q" are A""*" > 1,
A"~ < 1 and
^f^ > 1, with corresponding eigenvectors (x"+, 1,0)', (x"^, 1, 0)' and (0, 0, 1)
where
(l+r")(l-7)+^ +^fc"-l+y d+r")(l-7)+ =||^ + ^fc"-l]V4(.i +ii^)f^
2
(l+r")(l-7)+^ +^fc"-l-y (l+r'')(l-7)+^^+ ^fc"-l" V4(., +i±^)f^
A"+ = 1 +
and
A"- = 1 +
Therefore, the tangent plane to the unstable manifold of the normal steady state is the
plane through the normal steady state with directing vectors (x""*", 1,0) and (0,0, 1), and
the tangent line to its stable manifold is the line through the normal steady state with
directing vector (x"~, 1,0)'.
Similarly, the eigenvalues of fi* are A*"*" > 1, A**" < 1 and ^^~- < 1, with corresponding
eigenvectors (x*+,l,0)', (x*~,l,0)' and (0,0,1) where
A"+ = 1 +
and
A^ 1 +
(l+r«)(l-7)+^+^fc=-l+/ (l+r-)(l-7)+^+^fc--l V4(..+i±2_:£.)Ml
2
(l+r^)(l-7)+^ + ^fc-'-l-/ (l+r.')(l-7)+^ + ^fc^-l %4(.,+i±2^)Mi
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Therefore, the tangent hne to the unstable manifold of the speculative steady state is
the line through the speculative steady state with directing vectors (a;^"'",l,0)
,
and the
tangent plane to its stable manifold is the plane through the speculative steady state with
directing vectors (a;*'~, 1,0)' and (0,0, 1).
Let us now vary 5, k^ = k^{5) 7 — 7 ((5) and s^ = s^{6) in such a way that fc" =
s TT^+li^+^-a ) ^^ fixed, assumptions 0,1 and 4 are verified and |fc° — A;"| > eS for some e > 0.
Note that 7(5) < r" = ttq - ttiA;" for 5 > and lims-^ojiS) = r" = ttq - ttiA;". Also
k^{S) > fc" for <5 > and lim^^o A;°((5) = fc".
As we do this, k^, a;"+, x"", A"+,A"",x*+, x^~, A*+ and A'*" also vary. These vari-
ables are all continuous functions of 6. Let us denote them by A;^((5), x'^~^{5), x"~((5),
A"+(5),A"-(5), x'+{6), x'-{6), X'+{5) and A"-((5). It is clear that k'{S) = fc" + 0{S),
x"+((5) = x++0((5), x"-(^) = x-+0((5), A"+(5) - X++0{5), A"-(5) = A-+0(5), x^+(5) -
x+ + 0(5), x^-((J) = X- + 0(6), X'+{S) ^ A+ + 0((5) and X'-jS) ^ A" + 0(.5), with
A — 1+ 9 ,
(l+r")(l-r")+^+ ^fc"-l-^[(l+r'^)(l-r'')+:Llff;i + ^fc"-l] +4(,rt+i±^)^
A — i-r o
^ — e;;" > 0, X — et" < 0.
l+r" 1+ r'^
Because the dynamic system we consider is twice continuously differentiable in the
regions k < k^ and fc > /c°, the following results are true:
-there exists S > such that for all 5 < 6, there exist continuously differentiable
functions q'f : [fc°,fc"] x [0,Mb5] -> [l,+oo[ and g"+ : [A;",fc°] x [0,Mb5] ^ [l,+oo[ such
that the stable manifold of (fc*((5), 1,0) is parameterized by {k,b,q^^{k,b)) in the region
{k,b) G [k^,k^{6)] X [0, Mft^], and the unstable manifold of (fc",l,0) is parameterized by
(A;,6,5^+(fc)) in the region {k,b) e [fc",A;°] x [0,MbS].
-there exists ^ > f > and m > such that for all 5 <d, {k, b) G [fe°, fc^(5)] x [0, Mfc(5],
and (fc',6') G [/c",fc°] x [0,Mb6],
\qf{k,b) - 1 - x'-{d){k - k'iS))\ < m5^
and
|g^+(fc', 6') - 1 - x"+(5)(fc - fc")| < mS^.
Using the fact that k'{6) = /c" + 0(5), x'*-(<5) - x" -t- 0(5), x"+(5) = x+ -h 0(5),
A'*- (5) = A" -I- 0(5) and A"+(5) = A+ -I- 0(6), we see that there exists I>f>OandM>0
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such that for all 5 <5, {k,b) 6 [k^,k'{6)] x [0,Mb5], and {k\b') e [fc",/c°] x [0,MbS],
\ql-{k,b)-l-x-{k-k'(5))\ <M6^
and
\q'^+(k',b')-l-x+ik-k'')\ <M5'^.
The q = 1 + x~^{k — /c") plane intersects the k — k^ plane along the line k — k'^,q =
1 + x~^{k^ — A;"). Similarly the q = l + x~{k — k^{S)) plane intersects the k = k^ plane along
the line k = k^,q = I + x~{k^ — k'^{5)). Therefore, if 5 < (5
,
we have that
1 + a;-(A;° - k'{5)) + M^^ > 1 + x+{k - A;") - M5'^. (28)
is a necessary condition for the intersection of the unstable manifold of the normal steady
state with the vertical fc = /eq plane to lie below the intersection of stable manifold of the
speculative steady state with the vertical k = ko plane in the region b 6 [0, MhS].
Similarly, a sufficient condition is
1 + x-{k° - k'{5)) - M5^ > 1 + x+(fc - A;") + M5^. (29)
We can rewrite (28) and (29) as
A+ - 1 A;^ - A;° 2M5'^
< T7.—7z: +
1 - A" A;0 - A;" A:^ - A;"
and
A+ - 1 A:* - A;° 2M5'^
<
1 - A" A;0 - A;" k^ - k'^'
Using the fact that k^ — k^ > e5, we see that a necessary condition for a transition when
5 <^is
A+-1 A:"-A:° 2MS
1 _ A" ^ A;0 - A;" ^ e
and that a sufficient condition for a transition is
A+-1 k' - k° 2M5
1- A" k^ -k-^ ~'
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Notice that ^ -» when S -> O.This shows that if j^ < f^rf^, then there exists
rrih > such that a transition is possible for 5 small enough and < 6o < mt,6, and that if
^ ~i > ^aZ^ri then for 5 small enough, for every frib > 0, there exists < 6o < f^hS such
that no transition is possible with initial bubble 6o.
This condition holds if and only if
A+ -1 fc"-A:°
For ^ fco - fc^
'
which is exactly the same condition as without bubbles. The discussion of the possibility
of a transition is therefore entirely similar.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
It is also clear that the projection of the trajectory of the transition path with initial
bubble 6o > on the plane 6 = will lie below the trajectory of the transition path with zero
initial bubble. To see this, note that the projection of a trajectory with positive bubble can
only cross the projection of a trajectory with zero bubble from below. This proves the claim
since the projection of a transition path, with or without bubble ends in the speculative
steady state (fc*, 1, 0).
By the capital accumulation equation, this in turn implies that a transition path with
initial bubble 6o > will reach every plane k = h with k^ < h < k'^ after a larger number
of periods than the transition path with zero initial bubble.
Q.E.D.
C Proof of Propositions in Section 4
C.l Fiscal
We can rewrite the capital market equilibrium condition as
s{{l-T)w{kt),rt) + Tw{kt)
-gt= iqt + xt + ^0~'^{xt-j)'^] h + du
where
Let us define a net saving function
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s{w{kt),rt) = s((l - T)w{kt),rt) + Tw{kt) - gf
In this proposition, we perform a comparative statics exercise varying a (or equiva-
lently pj and keeping the normal steady state fixed. Therefore, let us denote by Sk —
as{{i~-r)Mkthrt)+rw{k,)^-g
^^^^ ^^
^ as{{i-r)w{k,),n)+rMk,.)-g
_
rj.^^^^
numbers do not depend
on a.
Note that a first order approximation of wages around the normal steady state is:
w{kt) = u;" + 7riA:"fcf
We therefore have the following first order approximation for the net saving function
~f fi.^ ^ y
s'^kt + srn + s^, k<k°-
s{w{kt),rt) = {
s'^kt + Srn + s^ + 6, k> k°,
where s'^ — Sk — QTTifc", and Sq = sq + "^^^^
Assumption 4 guarantees that the normal steady state is in a dynamically efficient
region, while the speculative steady state, if it exists, is in a dynamically inefficient region.
The speculative steady state, if it exists, is characterized by the following equations
k' > k°,
J{w{k'),r') = d' + il + j)k',
d' - ^-^(5 + a{w' - w") - Tw').
Similarly, in the normal steady state, we have
s(i(;(A;"),r") = (l + 7)fc",
r" = TTq - TTlfc",
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Using these equations, we can rewrite the conditions characterizing the speculative
steady state as
k' > k°,
s^{k' - fc") + Sr{r' - r") + <5 = d^ + (1 + 7)(fc^ - fc"),
r^-r" = -7ri(F-A:"),
7 — r*
We can solve these equations for /c®, w^ , r^ and d^
.
In particular, we get
\sl - n,sr - (1 + 7)] (fc^ -kn+S= ]^Sn7n%~S] ^'' " ^^^^^^^^^ ' ^"^^
We can rewrite this equation as
[1 + r" - 7ri(A;^ - A;")] 7rifc"(A;* - A;")
(5 = [(1 + 7) - Sfc + TTiSr] (/c*-fc")+a7rifc"(A;"-/c")+ (Q; - r)
7 — r" + 7ri(fc* — A;")
(30)
Using the fact that 1 + r" = 1 + r" - 7ri(A;'* - fc") > 0, (1 + 7) - Sfc - niSr > and
k^ > k^, we see that for a > r, the right hand side of this equation is greater than
[(1 + 7) - Sfc + T^isr] (fc° - A;") + Q7rifc"(A;° - A;").
It is clear that
lim {[(l + 7)-Sfc + 7riSr](fc°-A:")+a7riA;"(/c°-A;")} = +cx3.
a—+00
This proves that for a high enough (30) , has no solution.
We have the stronger result that a sufficient condition for (30) not to have a solution is
[a s /, A;0-A;", _1a > max < —;— ,,„,—-(1 j ),r > .
1 TTiA;" (A;0 - A;")
^
i J
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Therefore if
a >a where a < 1.
Q.E.D.
fcO-fc"
T— ; < 1, it can be the case that there is no solution for
A
C.2 External
We continue to assume that 5 is small so that we can make a first order approximation
around q — 1 and k = k^ for the transition from /c" to k^, if such transition is possible. Let
^ — (?< - 1)) ^t = {h - k"-), and zt = {zt - z") then the linearized dynamic system can be
written as:
Qt+i (l + r")(l-7) + (7ri^ + ?r(l + e)) 1+7 i + 7 1
(31)
+ 7
«t+i 1+7 qt + kt. (32)
The analysis and proofs that follow refer to the dynamic system described by (31) and
(32).
The speculative steady state is characterized by k^ = —,,
, ^
,'^J-'^/.
,
r > and P —
7ri(5 >0.
Tl (l+7)+'ri (1+7-Sfc
)
For a speculative growth path to exist, it must be the case that the unstable path of
the normal steady state intersects the k° line below the intersection of the latter and the
saddle path of the speculative steady state. We can express this condition as
,g A^+-l k'-k^A = <
where the superscript e stands for external and
(33)
A^+ = 1+
and
A"- = 1+
We have
-l+ (l+r")(l--7)+^ (i+e)fc"
1+7 + 1+7 + \/(-H-(l+r -)(1--7)+^
{i+e)fc"
1+7 + 1+7
-)'
sqefc"(i- 1+7
-i_4
7r]flfc"
1+7 1+7
-7)+^
(l+S)*:"
1+7 + 1+7 ^\
2
-l+(l+r'^)(l- /(--l+(l+r -)(1--7)+^
(i+e)fc"
1+7 + 1+7
)" -^-A 7ri9fc"(i- 1+7 4-4 n-^Sfc"
1+ 7 1+7
A^ -1 + 2-1-
,sie*"(i-^) ,^^,efen
1+
^ 1+7 +^T+T^
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This is true because we have assumed that Assumption 0' holds, which imphes that
+ (1 + r")(l - 7) +^ > and therefore
-l + (l + r")(l-7) + ^^^l±^ + ^>0.
A*^ is a decreasing function of
'Y^e 1+7 1+7
-l + (l + r»)(l-7)+
"'^iy"" +^
efc"
1+7 ' 1+7
T^ is non-monotonic in 9. It is increasing on (0, 9 ) and decreasing on {9" , +00), where
-l + (l + r")(l-7) + !^
1+7
In addition Um^^o """^ = 0, and Hme_,+oo '^'^ = 0.
—
€
As a result, A*^ is non-monotonic in 9. It is decreasing on (0, 9 ) and increasing on
{9 ,+00), and reaches a minimum for ^ = . In addition, we have lime_o A'^ = +00, and
lime_+oo A^ = +00.
Q.E.D.
C.3 Technologiccd progress
Let us assume that 6p = 1 — p is small so that we can make a first order approximation
around q = I and k = k"' for the transition from A;" to k^, if such transition is possible. Let
qt = {qt — 1) and kt = (fej — fc"), then the hnearized dynamic system can be written as:
qt+i
?t + i^t + [(1 + r-")7 - r^fc" + ^k''
kt < k°\
(34)
h+i =
^.^t + kt1+7- (35)
kt < k°-
^,qt + h + ^^5, k>k°,
The analysis and proofs that follow refer to the dynamic system described by (34) and
(35).
Assumption 5 (Minimum technological progress):
A
'^^>^-l+^n+l±2fc,
-(fc°-A;").
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Proposition 10 (Multiple Steady States)
If Assumption 3 is satisfied, the economy has two non-degenerate steady states, fc" and k",
with:
fc» ^ £L+B < feo < ,» + 1 + -" + (^+ 7)fc"/^.,^ ^ ,s^ (36)
where A = tti + (1 + 7 - Sk)/sr > 0, and the superscripts "n" and "s" stand for normal
and speculative, respectively.
Assumption 6 (Speculative adjustment costs region):
A fc"
A+-1 +—^'•Y+\, ,, ,0
— <
Proposition 11 (Multiple Equilibria and Speculative Growth)
If Assumptions 5 and 6 hold, there is a speculative growth path that takes the economy from
fc" to k'.
Proof:
Imposing q^i = qi and kt^i = kt and solving for k^ and q^ in
qt+i =
and
a-o(i-.) + (^ +^)r ^ Apqt-\— kt+ 1+7 Sr Sp
r- Ok"" ^ p ek"" ,
Kt+1 = :r-
—
qt + h + --— ()p,1+7 1+7
we find that fc* = -^— 5p and q'^ = — 5p. This is a steady state if and only if
k'^ > k^ — k^ — k^, which we can rewrite as
5„ >5p= ^TTT- (k° - A;") .
Let us now assume that this inequality holds. We now ask under what conditions a
transition from the normal steady state to the speculative steady state is possible. For a
speculative growth path to exist, it must be the case that the unstable path of the normal
steady state intersects the k° line below the intersection of the latter and the saddle path
of the speculative steady state. We can express this condition as
1+7 1+7
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We can rewrite (37) as
A fe"
\+ 1 J -ir 1+ 7 n
AJe!L ^ 1.0 _ l.n •
Q.E.D.
D Proof of Claims in Section 5
The curve nt — intersects the g = 1 hne at a point (1, k) if and only if
wjkt) - c f'ikt)
kt 1 + r
We make the assumption that this equation has at least one solution. If we assume for
example that f{kt) = Afcf , with < a < 1 and |u(l + r) > j^ and c < maxfc>o{/i-u;(/c) -
^-^—
-fk}, this assumption will be verified and the equation nt = will have exactly two
solutions.
Let k^ < k^ be the two first intersections of this curve with the g = 1 line (fci — +oo if
there is no second intersection).
We assume that there are two steady states A;" < fc* where /c" < fc°, and fc° < fc* < fc^.
Because in this framework it is now the interest rate in the normal steady state r + S
that depends on 5, we will approximate the dynamics of the system around the speculative
steady state (where the interest rate is r). Letting S tend to 0, we are moving the normal
steady state while keeping the speculative steady state fixed.
Assumption 7: A = s^tti + (1 + 7 - Sfc) > 0, k" = 2^ > k°.
Assumption 8 (Minimum growth-funding feedback): S > 5 = S7.7ri(fc* — fc°).
Assumption 9: (1 + /i) nik' - 7 - 3^ > and (^ + 7) - 2^ > 0.
The last assumption is made to make sure that locally, the n = curve is upward sloping
line with the low interest rate region to its right.
Let
y// i+7+g(gt-i) j^j
Et=[j+i9 + 7) {qt - 1) + e{qt - 1)2] h - ^iw{kt) -c+ ^ -kfJ 1 + r
Assuming that 5 and n* are small, let us perform a first order approximation around
q — q* = l and k = k^.
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Up to second order terms in qt — {qt - I) , kt — {kt — A;*), fco = (^° — k^), ^t = {Tt — t^),
nt = rit — n^, S and n'^, we have:
Ht =
-fkt + {e + -y)k'qt-{l + fi)Trik'kt-
niOk^'^
KiQks2
1+7
We have ft = if Et < — E'* and ft
qt
1 + 7
1 + ^i)'Kik - 7
•gt +
1 + r
kt
l + r
Sr
if Ef > —^*. Note that by assumption,
E* = 7fc* - /i(u;* - c) + j^fc" < and A;" = -^ < /to < 0.
St+i (l + r^)(l-7) + Y—T-i + 7 qt
+ TTikt + l{'Et<-S']—
kt+i = 7-
— 9t + kt-1+7
(38)
(39)
The analysis and proofs that follow refer to the dynamic system described by (38) and
(39).
For a speculative growth path to exist two conditions must be satisfied. First, it must
be the case that the unstable arm of the normal steady state is less steep than the E4 = —E*
line. Second it must be the case that the unstable arm of the normal steady state intersects
the Ej = —E* line below the intersection of the latter and the saddle path of the speculative
equilibrium. We can express these conditions as
^/ =
Af =
(l + M)7rifc^-7-^
(l+7)(l + ^) -TTifc'*
A^+-l
(l+'''''i'='-^Zlfe_(A-f+-l)
(A/^ - >o,
_
(l+7)(l
i-xf- <
(l+.W^--7-T^ ^. _^,_
(l+7)(l+ ^)-"lfc' ^
k" -k
kO-k'^'
where
A^+ = 1 +
We can rewrite A-^ as:
(l+rnil-l}+^
-V (l+'-»)(l-7)+^-l ^^ 1+7
2
(l+r=)(l-7)+^
-.-/ d+r=)(l-7)+^-l 2 ,.,efc»+* 1+7
and
46

^^f
1
I
(l+M)7rifc--7-i^
^ '^
^
~
^ " (l+7)(l+ i)-lfe»
We have
lim *^ <
SO that no transition is possible for too large adjustment costs because the slope of the
unstable arm of the normal steady state goes to +oo while the slope of the Et = —5* tends
to a finite positive limit.
Similarly
lim ^•' — —oo,
so that no transition is possible because the unstable arm of the normal steady state
is too steep (the slope of which tends to a finite strictly positive limit) and overshoots the
Et = —H* line (the slope of which tends to 0).
Therefore, a transition can only occur for intermediate adjustment costs.
Let us define the Assumption 10 as requiring that the two conditions for a transition be
satisfied.
Assumption 10: '^^{9) > and A^iO) < ^^
We have proved the following propositions.
Proposition 12 (Multiple Steady States)
If Assumptions 7, 8 and 9 are satisfied, the economy has two non-degenerate steady states,
A;" and k^, with:
j^n ^ JL^ Sri < fco < fc^ = JL^ 2rZ. (40)
TTi TTl
Proposition 13 (Multiple Equilibria and Speculative Growth)
If Assumptions 7, 8, 9 and 10 hold, there is a speculative growth path that takes the economy
from fc" to k^ . Along that path, qt >
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